The Problem
Overall Negative Fleet Impact
Following the public release of the June 22, 2023, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, there has been significant national press attention to the realization that, as reported by CRS, 37% of the US Navy’s nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) force is unavailable for operation due to long term maintenance. Data from this CRS Report is shown below in both its original Table format and as a graph. Note that the trend line is adverse – going the wrong way. Given this heightened public and press interest, the company has elected to release details of its plan to immediately and affordably address this crisis.
GAO: “When ships and submarines are late coming out of maintenance . . . our National Security is therefore impacted”
Naval shipyard capacity is not adequate for today’s fleet
It is even less adequate for a larger future fleet
Too many SSNs are sidelined waiting for required maintenance
Construction shipyards are fully engaged in construction –they are not the maintenance solution
There is a shortage of skilled trades on the nation’s three ocean coasts
SSNs are unnecessarily sidelined when needed most
The Navy – Doing What it Can While Safely Navigating the Heavy Seas of Conflicting Priorities
During the Cold War, the Navy successfully operated and maintained 100 attack submarines, but was forced to dramatically reduce both fleet size and maintenance capability as part of the harvesting of the ‘peace dividend’ during the 1990s
The Budget Control Act of 2011 then resulted in a further significant reduction of capability/manpower at the 4 Naval Shipyards while unprecedented heavy CVN deployments significantly increased their maintenance/overhaul demand. SSN readiness suffered as a sad, predictable result
With 100+ year-old industrial facilities, the Navy has started a planned 20-year-long $21 Billion capital upgrade program for its Naval Shipyard Facilities and has hired additional shipyard staff
With a great power competition heating back up, fleets are growing more quickly than shipyard capacity
The sad result: SSN readiness suffers
U.S. Naval Shipyard Maintenance Priority Ranking
Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)
Aircraft Carriers (CVNs)
Attack Submarines (SSNs) –High Priority Capital Warships, but the lowest priority for Naval Shipyard maintenance
The Problem Has Roots From
More than 30 Years Ago
Repair facilities were reduced after the Cold War by much more than the fleet size as the BRAC process was dollar-driven to deliver a “Peace Dividend”
Failing to Update the Aging Naval Shipyards
Made The Problem Worse
Shipyard Recapitalization Under the SIOP Program is Scheduled to Take 20 Years and Cost >$20 Billion to Complete but Many Consider this Schedule to Strategically be Far Too Long
The global war on terror increased maintenance demand, while the Budget Control Act of 2011 reduced resources
After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Navy started maintaining a constant Aircraft Carrier Battle Group presence in the Persian Gulf area –for a significant time maintaining two Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups in the area.
The increased aircraft carrier operating tempo increased maintenance demand even as Enterprise was decommissioned and Gerald Ford was late in delivering.
The Budget Control Act of 2011 then resulted in limiting hiring at the Naval Shipyards as maintenance demand went up. This started a cascading maintenance delay problem which, because of priorities, has had the greatest adverse impact on the attack submarine fleet.
The Naval Shipyard maintenance challenge is more significant when looking forward
While the Biden Administration is still evaluating the Navy’s future fleet plans, it seems clear to us, on a strategic basis, that any future fleet plan will include a larger attack submarine force.
Virginia Class submarines are larger, more capable and more complex than the Los Angeles Class submarines which they are replacing.
Our estimate, guided by our experience in designing & building Virginia Class, is that it takes approximately 20% more skilled trades labor hours to build a Virginia Class ship than a Los Angeles Class ship.
The combination of a likely larger attack submarine force fleet comprised of more capable, more complex ships, will require increased Naval shipyard capacity and capability, even after the current maintenance backlog is resolved.
The resources available through The Bartlett Maritime Plan™ can restore required Naval shipyard capacity and capability
GAO Documents Reveal a Decade of
Naval Shipyard Maintenance Delays
$1.5 Billion spent just to crew inoperable submarines over a decade
USS Helena (SSN 725) – a Case Study
USS Helena (SSN 725) at Norfolk Naval Shipyard on April 7, 2022.
An Ongoing “6 Month” Docking SRA has Taken More Than Twice as Long as Ship Construction Took*
*Keel Laying to Delivery – Current Shipyard Schedule is 213% of Construction Span Time
Bartlett Maritime Corporation Analysis
Submarine Idle Time Continues to Get Worse Over Time
Fleet Idle Time Continues to Get Worse Over Time
Maintenance Delays Continue to Get Worse Over Time
USS Columbus (SSN 762) – Even More Disturbing
Nearly four Years into a 2-year Overhaul, the Cost and Schedule for the regular overhaul of USS Columbus (SSN 762) was essentially reset - as if no work had been done to date – 2.5 more years and more than $400 Million more cost to complete this ongoing overhaul.
Bartlett Maritime Corporation Analysis
The U.S. Navy, Appropriately, Will Not Operate Submarines Which Are Overdue For Maintenance
USS Boise (SSN 764) will go an entire decade between deployments
Three problems all drive the same bad result: ships unavailable for operations
The U.S. Naval Shipyard industrial complex is in poor condition. These poor conditions are well documented and have led to the development and implementation of the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). More information regarding the 20 year/$21 Billion SIOP plan is available HERE
The U.S. Naval Shipyard industrial complex does not have the capacity required to accomplish their assigned mission. The U.S. Navy requires two additional VPM Virginia Class-capable drydocks, as well as additional industrial facilities (overhaul shops, a foundry, highly specialized NDT facilities)
Perhaps most challenging of all, the U.S. Naval Shipyard industrial complex is understaffed and competes for skilled trades labor in an over-extended labor pool, which also serves other U.S. Navy-related shipyard facilities. Anyone who wants to work or is capable of working in a shipyard is already working in one of America’s shipyards. A new labor pool is required
Too many submarines are parked awaiting delayed maintenance and too many CVNs are “double-pumping” deployments due to delayed maintenance. Many consider the 20-year SIOP schedule to be strategically far too long
USS Toledo (SSN 769) Finally Enters Drydock during Naval Shipyard Overhaul May 1, 2021.
When USS Toledo (SSN 769) arrived at Norfolk Naval Shipyard on January 21, 2021 to begin a planned 2-year engineered overhaul, expected to require approximately 3.5 million manhours of effort, its scheduled drydock was unavailable.
Drydock 2 at the shipyard, the assigned drydock, was in the midst of its own overhaul. This meant that many Toledo maintenance activities had to be resequenced, modified or delayed until the ship was docked. As only one example, the ship’s diesel generator was required to support docking, so all planned maintenance work on the diesel generator and it’s numerous support systems was impacted by this delayed docking. The drydock overhaul upgraded and rehabilitated the caisson, flood wall and piping and was conducted as part of the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). This urgently required SIOP effort, as is the case with many other SIOP activities, conflicted with the conduct of planned ship maintenance.
With the drydock upgrade and rehabilitation work completed, Toledo finally was docked on May 1, 2021. DVIDS - Video - USS Toledo (SSN 769) Enters Dry Dock 2 at Norfolk Naval Shipyard (dvidshub.net)
The problem is simply inadequate U.S. Naval shipyard capacity and capability
In the last year alone, two CVNs have “double-pumped” deployments due to other CVNs being delayed in maintenance
This plan also erases “The Friction” in the OFRP aircraft carrier deployment cycle plan
How to improve maintenance activities is “the largest source of friction” in the OFRP cycle today according to Fleet Forces Command; USNI News 10/28/20
Relieving the overload at Norfolk and Puget Sound Naval shipyards keeps CVNs at sea
Poor shipyard conditions and the adverse fleet impact are well documented by GAO
No Aircraft Carriers Available to Cover the Summer 2021 Afghanistan Withdrawal
USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) – permanently assigned to cover the Western Pacific – had to be reassigned
All other Aircraft Carriers were in overdue/extended maintenance periods or are working up from long maintenance periods and are unavailable for tasking
Two Aircraft Carriers were in refueling overhaul
The newest Aircraft Carrier was not yet certified for deployment
